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Abstract 
 
 
A common assumption in the philosophical literature on forgiveness is that one can only forgive culpable 
moral agents. In this paper, I will argue against this assumption. Using the notorious case of Andrea 
Yates, I will show one can forgive non-culpable wrongdoers. I will argue that forgiveness involves 
letting go of negative reactive attitudes and those attitudes arise in a wide variety of cases including 
accidental wrongdoing and wrongs committed by those who are mentally incompetent or insane. 
Responding to such wrongdoings with forgiveness is not only possible, but also often advisable. 
 
 
 
 
Early on the morning of June 20, 2001, Rusty Yates left his Texas home to go to work 
as he would on any other day.  He received a phone call later that morning from his 
wife Andrea stating that he needed to come home. Andrea Yates, while her husband 
was away, had intentionally drowned their 5 children, the youngest of which was only 
six months old. Yates admitted to committing the crime as soon as the officers arrived 
at the scene and stated that she had been considering killing them for a substantial 
amount of time. 
 
Andrea Yates believed that her children had been marked by Satan, and that the only 
way to save them from hell was to kill them. She believed that when she was punished 
for killing her children, Satan would be destroyed. She had a long, complex history of 
mental health problems complicated by the hormonal aftermath of giving birth. Shortly 
after giving birth to her first child, Yates began having hallucinations. After the birth of 
her fourth child, she attempted to overdose on medication, self-harmed, and held a 
knife to her own throat. These and many other psychotic episodes plagued the life of 
Andrea Yates, calling into question the accountability of Yates in the murder of her 
children. 
 
Andrea Yates was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison in her first 
trial. Due to false evidence given by a witness, her conviction was later overturned. In 
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her second trial, Yates was found not guilty by reason of insanity and sent to a mental 
institution to receive treatment. In order for Andrea Yates to successfully plead insanity 
in the state of Texas at the time, she must have met the criteria specified by the revised 
M’Naughten test.1 This test holds that an individual is insane at the time of a crime if 
she was unable to either “know the nature or the consequences of an act” or “know that 
the act was right or wrong”. The defense ultimately claimed that Yates believed killing 
her children was morally right on the grounds that it would save them from damnation, 
even though she recognized that doing so was against the law (Ewing & McCann, 229-
238). 
 
Criminal cases involving the mentally ill or those with diminished cognitive capacities 
have arisen again and again. The standards for defining insanity have been debated and 
range from a cognitive test of whether the offender knew the action was wrong to 
behavioral tests that question whether or not the individual would have committed the 
crime in the presence of a police officer (Costanzo &Krauss, 161).  Those with 
intellectual disabilities and certain types of mental illness are also subject to 
competency examinations. If the wrongdoer is not competent and competency cannot 
be restored, the individual will be civilly committed, but not found guilty of any crime 
(Costanzo & Krauss, 182).  
 
One thing that is certain is that the case of Andrea Yates often provokes strong 
emotions, horror, and outrage. These emotions tend to arise whether or not the 
individual believes that Yates was “legally insane” at the time she committed the crime. 
Those close to Yates and her children must have been all the more hurt and outraged at 
the news of the death of the children. If the family and friends of Andrea Yates were to 
continue a positive relationship with Yates after the crime, something seemingly must 
happen to lessen these feelings of anger, outrage, resentment, etc.  
 
Jessica Wolfendale states, “Both resentment and forgiveness require a belief that the 
other is a culpable and responsible moral agent who intentionally committed a wrong 
action. We can only forgive those who we believe are responsible for their actions” 
(Wolfendale, 349). Jeffrie Murphy believes that forgiveness is often confused with 
other responses to wrong-doing, such as excusing.  If conduct is excused, the action 
performed was morally wrong, but the wrong-doer lacks the ability to behave in 
normative manner or cannot, for reason of mental disorder for example, be deemed a 
responsible agent. Murphy thinks that resentment of such an individual is irrational, and 
                                                          
1 The revised M’ Naughten test, while still the most common standard, is debated. Several states 
have entirely abolished the insanity defense while others have added volitional clauses to the M’ 
Naughten standards. The philosophical debate over the adequacy of this standard of insanity is 
interesting in its own right, but will not be addressed here. Even if a specific standard for 
deciding legal insanity is yet to be determined, it seems that Andrea Yates would be considered 
to be clearly insane under any standard. 
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forgiveness is again out of place. (Murphy, 13) In addition, he holds that some 
emotions are based on beliefs that are either rational or irrational. Most individuals who 
claim an emotion is irrational do so because it seems to lack a purpose or use, it “is not 
fitting to its object”, or because it is self-defeating or based on an unjustified belief. In 
the case of Andrea Yates, Murphy would hold either that resentment is not fitting to its 
object because Yates could not be considered a responsible moral agent at the time she 
committed the crime or that the emotions felt towards Yates were based on irrational 
beliefs about the status of Yates as a moral agent. 
 
Similarly, Charles Griswold holds that, unless a wrong-doer is shown to be a 
responsible moral agent, “pardoning” or “excusing” takes the place of forgiveness. 
Forgiveness is only appropriate in cases where the wrong was “done (in some sense) 
voluntarily” (Griswold, 7). Griswold draws a distinction between mitigating factors and 
exculpatory factors. Mitigating factors serve to lessen the severity of the wrong or the 
pain caused by the wrong. For example, the pain I caused my friend by yelling at them 
may be lessened if my friend knows that I had a frustrating day at work. Exculpatory 
factors are those that exonerate the wrong-doer of guilt completely. Mental illness and 
the insanity defense would fall under this category.  
 
When it comes to punishment, especially in the legal sense, exculpatory factors 
completely absolve the offender of guilt, therefore abdicating the need for punishment. 
Griswold and many others seem to lump forgiveness into the same category because 
forgiving a wrong-doer entails that the wrong-doer is a moral agent who committed the 
act with no exculpatory factors (Griswold, 7). However, anger and resentment seem to 
be directed at the wrong-doer regardless of if the wrong-doer qualifies as a genuine 
moral agent. Murphy’s claim that this response is irrational does not negate the fact that 
an angry or resentful response often still occurs. As seen in the Yates case, it seems 
implausible to expect those closest to Andrea Yates to feel no resentment or anger 
towards her, even given her psychological state at the time of the crime. While it is 
debatable that these emotions are a rational response, they need not be fully rational for 
forgiveness to be an appropriate response, as will be argued later. The presence of these 
negative emotions directed at the wrong-doer after being the victim of a wrong is 
sufficient for forgiveness to at least be an option morally, arguably a healthy one. 
 
While the mental illness may mitigate the severity of the anger and resentment, it does 
not (at least in most cases) completely extinguish negative emotions towards the 
wrongdoer who committed the wrong action. The existence of negative emotions 
towards the individual seems to leave room for the victim to forgive the offender, 
regardless of whether the offender is considered a responsible moral agent. Even in 
cases that do not concern mental illness, the forgiveness of a party does not seem to 
hinge on the action being voluntary as Griswold and Wolfendale have suggested. For 
example, imagine a woman was driving down the road and happened to hit a child 
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completely by accident. The driver was not negligent in her attention, nor did she act 
recklessly or without care during her drive. It would be far from irrational to expect the 
child’s parents to not feel anger or resentment at the driver, even after learning the 
accidental nature of the incident.  In fact, we would probably assert that something was 
wrong with the parents if they did not exhibit some negative emotional reaction towards 
the individual who killed their child. Furthermore, we would probably think the driver 
was morally questionable if he or she did not feel some degree of self-resentment after 
the incident. 
 
These examples provide motivation for the possibility that the wrong-doer’s status as a 
moral agent who, at least in some sense, committed the action voluntarily is 
unnecessary for forgiveness. Forgiveness seems to hinge on two factors: 
 
1. Person X did the wrong action A. 
2. Those affected by A have negative attitudes, emotions, or beliefs about X 
regarding A. 
 
However, the addition of the third condition: 
 
3. A is a rational moral agent capable of recognizing the wrongness of X who 
did the action voluntarily, at least in some sense is not necessary under 
several common accounts of forgiveness, especially those that define 
forgiveness as a reduction in negative emotions towards the wrong-doer, 
with or without the addition of positive attitudes. The absence of the third 
condition does not serve as exculpatory when it comes to the emotions of 
victims, leaving room for forgiveness to occur. 
 
It is important to distinguish between two types of anger at this point: moral anger and 
raw, situational anger. Moral anger occurs in response to the violation of the moral 
code or in response to being treated in a way that the standards of morality condemn by 
another moral agent. Raw anger is anger felt that has nothing to do with the moral code. 
It can be the anger felt when one stubs his toe, or just the morality-independent anger 
felt when we are harmed by another. When one is the victim of a wrong, part of the 
anger is based in a respect for the moral code and being treated in a way that goes 
against that code. However, moral anger alone does not account for the entire emotional 
response. When one takes a wrong personally, raw anger co-occurs with moral anger. 
Both types of anger can be appropriately responded to with forgiveness provided 
conditions 1 and 2 are met. While forgiveness is appropriate for moral anger, its 
boundaries extend to include cases of raw anger that involve a relational aspect with 
another human being.  
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Several prominent theories of forgiveness could function equally as well without 
condition 3 while better capturing our intuitions in cases like the Yates example. While 
Murphy does hold that 3 is necessary, several of his ideas serve to bolster the argument 
against condition 3. Murphy defines forgiveness as, “the overcoming, on moral 
grounds, of what I will call the vindictive passions.” (Murphy, 16). These vindictive 
passions (anger, resentment, hatred, etc.) prompt acts of vengeance against the wrong-
doer, where vengeance is defined as intentionally causing the wrong-doer to suffer in 
order to satisfy vindictive emotions. In cases of mental illness and accidental wrong-
doings, these negative feelings often arise. These vindictive passions can play a 
“morally valuable role in human psychology”. While vindictive passions may prompt 
immoral acts, they are tied to self-respect and self-defense (Murphy, 18). 
 
In reality, resentment serves to defend three important values: self-respect, self-defense, 
and respect for the moral order. In the chapter “Two Cheers for Vindictiveness,” 
Murphy states that resentment “stand[s] as emotional testimony that we care about 
ourselves and our rights.” (Murphy, 19). Therefore, a lack of resentment in the face of a 
wrong-doing may reflect a lack of respect for oneself as a moral being. Moreover, such 
emotional reactivity is necessary for the morally virtuous person. Motivation is driven 
primarily by emotion, and the morally virtuous person is one who will be motivated to 
act in response to a wrong-doing. Having a mere intellectual belief about wrongness or 
one’s worth is not the same as having an emotional reaction. A moral agent who truly 
respects himself as thus will react both emotionally and intellectually to a wrong-doing 
committed against him.  Similarly, this emotional reaction will show the agent’s 
allegiance to the moral order itself, which Murphy thinks we all have a duty to support. 
 
Murphy’s upholding of condition 3 still commits him to saying that anger and other 
vindictive emotions are irrational in the case of Andrea Yates. However, this claim 
seems to fall victim to his own criticisms. In this scenario, the moral person seemingly 
would not just intellectually accept the wrong action as an unfortunate consequence of 
psychosis. Instead, the moral person would be one who was truly upset by the action 
and, in some sense, felt resentment towards Yates or towards the mental illness that 
prompted the action. A cold, detached statement that Yates is excused due to mental 
illness seems to show that something is wrong with the individual who espoused this 
view so calmly. If forgiveness is the reduction of the types of emotions described by 
Murphy, and a rational individual would feel these emotions after being the victim of a 
crime committed by someone who is not acting voluntarily and as a moral agent, 
forgiveness is potentially applicable in these cases. We will examine the rationality of 
anger in this case later in the paper.2   
                                                          
2 Another common conception of forgiveness involves not holding the offense against the wrong-
doer, or “wiping the slate clean”. Lucy Allais argues that wiping the slate clean requires a change 
in affective attitudes towards the wrong-doer and no longer attaching the wrong-doing to the 
offender’s character, or “making some kind of separation between the wrong-doer and his wrong 
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While the third condition is at least not necessary for forgiveness on the preceding 
account, it does seem to be necessary for Griswold’s ideal forgiveness. Griswold lists 
six actions the wrong-doer must take in order for this to be accomplished. For example, 
the wrong-doer must take responsibility for taking the wrong acts in question. A failure 
to do so would further insult or hurt the victim and undermine the wrong-doer’s 
trustworthiness and commitment to not repeating the act. Without an acknowledgment 
of responsibility, the most that can be accomplished is condonation. Another condition 
is that the wrong-doer must reject the wrong action and deny the desire or willingness 
to commit similar acts in the future. This repudiation must be sincere and assure the 
victim that the wrong-doer is not the same person as the individual who committed the 
wrong act. The completion of requirements like these allows the victim to be sure that 
the correct act has been targeted and that forgiveness is the right course of action 
(Griswold, 47-59). 
 
The completion of these requirements seems to be in tension with the possibility of 
forgiving someone who was not morally responsible for the wrongdoing. The wrong-
doer would obviously not be able to take responsibility for the crime. While Yates did 
admit to carrying out the action, her inability to recognize it as wrong precludes her 
from taking responsibility in any meaningful way. The wrongdoer also seems less able 
to distance herself from the wrong action because the wrong action was not under the 
offender’s control. 
 
Griswold’s ideal forgiveness is not available in cases involving extreme psychosis, but 
a “less ideal” version may still be available. It is unclear whether or not Griswold thinks 
that these conditions are necessary for any forgiveness or only for ideal forgiveness. 
Intuitively, forgiveness seems to occur in cases where these conditions are not met. It 
seems plausible that we can forgive a stranger, for example. If someone broke into my 
car and stole money from me, it seems like I can forgive them while never learning 
their identity. Griswold may also be making a normative claim about when a victim 
should forgive, that is when all of the conditions have been met by both the victim and 
the wrong-doer. Therefore, while the example of Andrea Yates may not be able to meet 
all of Griswold’s conditions, that does not preclude it from counting as a genuine 
example of forgiveness, even if not in the “ideal” sense. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
act in the way she feels about him, such that the wrong act does not play a role in the way the 
victim affectively sees the wrongdoer” (Allais, 51).This type of forgiveness could also apply in 
the case of Andrea Yates. It would not seem odd to say that her action affected how those close 
to her viewed her from an emotional standpoint. Upon the sight of Andrea Yates, negative 
emotions and thoughts her wrong actions could arise. Yates would be forgiven if her family and 
friends became able to see her as more than just this wrong action or did not hold this wrong 
action against her in terms of affective attitudes towards Yates. Furthermore, an appreciation of 
her mental illness might serve as a mitigating factor, making forgiveness easier for the victims. 
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One potential objection is that the anger and negative emotions that arise in these cases 
are not directed at the wrongdoer. If a tornado were to destroy my house, I would 
probably experience a strong, negative emotional reaction. The reaction is akin to anger 
at the unfairness of life or something similar. Perhaps the emotions of those who knew 
Andrea Yates and her children are similar in nature. They are not directing our negative 
emotions at Yates, but instead are angry that they live in a world in which these types 
of horrors occur. While this objection is convincing, I think that it lacks explanatory 
power. The negative emotions that occur as a result of a Yates like scenario seem to 
resurface when in the presence of the wrong-doer. If the anger were not directed 
specifically at Yates, then an increase in emotion in her presence would seem 
unwarranted.  
 
In some cases, however, negative emotions do arise in the presence of non-human 
objects related to the wrongdoing. Although PTSD such as scenarios do occur in the 
presence of inanimate objects, that does not undermine the idea that the anger is 
directed at Yates. It may be true that after being in a car accident the driver will have 
fear and negative emotions in the presence of cars. The emotions felt in the Yates case 
still seem to differ. It seems unlikely that any object related to the incident, a bath tub 
for example, would bring about the same type of emotion that would be felt towards 
Yates. 
 
Along the same lines, one may object by saying my second condition  
 
2. Those affected by A have negative attitudes, emotions, or beliefs about X 
regarding A is not strong enough. If rationality were built into condition 2 in the 
appropriate way, the third condition would be necessary as the common view 
suggests.  
 
The stronger version of 2 could read as follows: 
 
2*. Those affected by A have rational negative attitudes, emotions, or beliefs 
about X regarding A. 
 
By building rationality into the clause about the types about emotions, we rule out 
forgiveness in the case of irrational emotions. In order to hold that forgiveness is 
appropriate in the case of Andrea Yates, I must either defend the anger towards Yates 
as rational, reject 2*, or reject that 2* necessitates condition 3.  
 
One potential response is to hold that anger towards Andrea Yates is a rational negative 
attitude. Based off of Murphy’s ways in which an emotion may be irrational, we 
conclude that the emotion must be self-defeating, not fitting to its object, or based on an 
irrational belief. It seems unlikely to be self-defeating in any sense, but the second two 
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possibilities seem more probable. Anger towards Yates could seemingly be irrational 
because such emotions are not fitting when expressed towards an individual who is not 
a moral agent or because it is based on the erroneous belief that Yates was a capable 
moral agent who acted at least in some sense intentionally. These two options require 
too much to satisfy the conditions, and are, in fact, more than substantive thoughts that 
those on which individuals typically base emotions. 
 
When we are the victims of a wrongdoing, thoughts concerning the moral status of the 
offender do not readily come to mind. Our initial emotional reaction is based off of the 
belief that a wrong-doing has been done of which you are a victim and that wrong-
doing has caused you, at least to some extent, emotional and/or physical harm. In part, 
this may be due to the inability of the victim not to blame the wrong-doer at least in 
part. It seems unlikely that the victim could ever be completely certain that the offender 
was not a moral agent or that the wrong was entirely accidental and unavoidable. All 
that matters is that the offender played a causal role in the pain the victim is currently 
feeling. After reflection, the mental state of the offender or the accidental nature of the 
crime may serve to mitigate the pain felt, but such thoughts are absent in the formation 
of the original emotional response. The belief on which the emotions are founded 
seems to have little to do with the status of the offender as a moral agent, so it seems 
unfit to call the emotion irrational. The belief on which the emotion was founded was a 
rational belief that need not include any ideas about the agency of the offender, 
something akin to the belief that “You played a large causal role in how I feel or in my 
being currently in a state of pain.” An individual may not be blameworthy for the 
wrong act, but a wrong act did occur and brought about negative reactions in the victim. 
 
The stronger argument in favor of forgiveness in these cases is that it seems quicker and 
easier to forgive rather than go through a cognitive restructuring involving a reappraisal 
of the events and wrong-doer in order to reduce negative emotions. Attempting to take 
into account all of the surrounding circumstances and the mental state of the offender at 
the time is a laborious, time-consuming task. Furthermore, we would have to be 
capable of clearly distinguishing mitigating factors from exculpatory ones. As 
evidenced by the abundance of standards by which the insanity defense has been 
judged, determining whether an individual was a responsible agent who acted 
intentionally seems difficult at best. In cases of accidental wrongs, it seems as though 
we would have to have some standard by which we determined if it were accidental 
enough to be exculpatory or just mitigating. If my friend broke my favorite pen and 
claimed that it was completely accidental, my excusing them would depend on both it 
actually being an accident and me believing my friends account of the accidental nature 
of the wrong. In this case, my friend may very well be lying so that he will be excused. 
If his story is a lie, I would have then excused wrongly in a situation where forgiveness 
was the appropriate response. Proposing that we do forgive in the case of accidents and 
in cases like that of Andrea Yates avoids the problems brought about by our inability to 
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determine the status of the moral agent or the accidental nature of the wrong. Rather 
than dealing with standards of insanity and whether or not an agent meets or does not 
meet them, we could instead opt for forgiveness while allowing the circumstances to 
mitigate the feelings of resentment. 
 
While this may not be an “ideal” sense of forgiveness, it is a legitimate one. In the case 
of Andrea Yates, forgiveness intuitively seems appropriate and seems to be the more 
pragmatic option considering the controversy of the insanity defense. This pragmatic 
rationale holds even if the emotions we are reducing are not fully rational emotions in 
Murphy’s sense. What matters for forgiveness is that these emotions are present, 
rationally or not, and must be dealt with somehow for the sake of the victim and the 
offender. Ruling out forgiveness as an option seems to unnecessarily limit the responses 
a victim may have and commit them to a heavy cognitive burden of convincing him or 
herself that the offender has met the exculpatory burden. Being rational may be 
necessary for “ideal” forgiveness, but when it’s acceptable or pragmatic to forgive need 
not meet these high standards 
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